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On August 9th, 1945, the US dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki. It killed a third of the population instantly, and the survivors, or hibakusha, would be affected by the life-altering medical conditions caused by the radiation for the rest of their lives. They were also marked with the stigma of their exposure to radiation, and fears of the consequences for their children. Nagasaki follows the previously unknown stories of five survivors and their families, from 1945 to the present day. It captures the full range of pain, fear, bravery and compassion unleashed by the destruction of a city. Susan Southard has interviewed the hibakusha over many years and her intimate portraits of their lives show the consequences of nuclear war. Nagasaki tells the neglected story of life after nuclear war and will help shape public debate over one of the most controversial wartime acts in history. Published for the 70th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, this is the first study to be based on eye-witness accounts of Nagasaki in the style of John Hersey's Hiroshima. On August 9th, 1945, three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, a 5-tonne plutonium bomb was dropped on the small, coastal city of Nagasaki. The explosion destroyed factories, shops and homes and killed 74,000 people while injuring another 75,000. The two atomic bombs marked the end of a global war but for the tens of thousands of survivors it was the beginning of a new life marked with the stigma of being hibakusha (atomic bomb-affected people). Susan Southard has spent a decade interviewing and researching the lives of the hibakusha, raw, emotive eye-witness accounts, which reconstruct the days, months and years after the bombing, the isolation of their hospitalisation and recovery, the difficulty of re-entering daily life and the enduring impact of life as the only people in history who have lived

through a nuclear attack and its aftermath. Following five teenage survivors from 1945 to the present day Southard unveils the lives they have led, their injuries in the annihilation of the bomb, the dozens of radiation-related cancers and illnesses they have suffered, the humiliating and frightening choices about marriage they were forced into as a result of their fears of the genetic diseases that may be passed through their families for generations to come. The power of Nagasaki lies in the detail of the survivors' stories, as deaths continued for decades because of the radiation contamination, which caused various forms of cancer. Intimate and compassionate, while being grounded in historical research Nagasaki reveals the censorship that kept the suffering endured by the hibakusha hidden around the world. For years after the bombings news reports and scientific research were censored by U.S. occupation forces and the U.S. government led an efficient campaign to justify the necessity and morality of dropping the bombs. As we pass the seventieth anniversary of the only atomic bomb attacks in history Susan Southard captures the full range of pain, fear, bravery and compassion unleashed by the destruction of a city. The personal stories of those who survived beneath the mushroom clouds will transform the abstract perception of nuclear war into a visceral human experience. Nagasaki tells the neglected story of life after nuclear war and will help shape public discussion and debate over one of the most controversial wartime acts in history. An important investigation of the sociocultural fallout of America's work on the atomic bomb In *The Nuclear Borderlands*, Joseph Masco offers an in-depth look at the long-term consequences of the Manhattan Project. Masco examines how diverse groups in and around Los Alamos, New Mexico understood and responded to the U.S. nuclear weapons project in the post-Cold War period. He shows that the American focus on potential nuclear apocalypse during the Cold War obscured the broader effects of the nuclear complex on society, and that the atomic bomb produced a new cognitive orientation toward daily life, reconfiguring concepts of time, nature, race, and citizenship. This updated edition includes a brand-new preface by the author discussing current developments in nuclear politics and the scientific impact of the nuclear age on the present epoch of a human-altered climate. Publisher Fact Sheet The definitive history of India's long flirtation with nuclear capability, culminating in the nuclear tests that surprised the world in May 1998. E.L. Doctorow suggested that in the years since 1945 the nuclear bomb has come to compose the identity of the American people. Developing this theme, Hugh Gusterson shows how the military-industrial complex has transformed public culture & personal psychology in America, to create a nuclear people. With a new preface by the author *Controversial in nature*, this book demonstrates that the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb against Japan. Alperovitz criticizes one of the most hotly debated precursory events to the Cold War, an event that was largely responsible for the evolution of post-World War II American politics and culture. *Life and Times of the Atomic Bomb* takes up the question of how the world found itself in the age of nuclear weapons – and how it has since tried to find a way out of it. Albert I. Berger charts the story of nuclear weapons from their origins through the Atomic Age and the Cold War up through the present day, arguing that an understanding of the history of nuclear weapons is crucial to modern efforts to manage them. This book examines topics including nuclear strategy debates, weapon system procurement decisions, and arms control conferences through the people and leaders who experienced them. Providing a chronological survey, *Life and Times of the Atomic Bomb* starts with the major scientific discoveries of the late 19th century that laid the groundwork for nuclear development. It then traces the history of nuclear weapons from their inception to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and the reaction to them by key players on both sides. It continues its narrative into the second half of the twentieth century, and the role of nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War, engaging in the debate over whether nuclear weapons are an

effective deterrent. Finally, the closing chapters consider the atomic bomb's place in the modern world and the transformation of warfare in an age of advanced technology. This clear and engaging survey will be invaluable reading for students of the Cold War and twentieth-century history. The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation. Two scholars of international politics debate the issue of nuclear proliferation beyond the superpowers, presenting arguments for "more will be better" and "more will be worse" Nuclear weapons have played an important role in times of war and peace since they were first used in 1945. The use of these weapons has been a topic of strong debate for over 70 years. Readers explore both sides of the debate surrounding these weapons. They also learn the origin of nuclear weapons and the science and technology behind this game-changing development in modern warfare. The environmental impact of nuclear warfare is also addressed. Readers are introduced to this topic through informative main text, additional fact boxes, and photographs. Based on extensive research in government archives and private papers, this book analyzes the secret debate within the Eisenhower administration over the pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement. In contrast to much recent scholarship, this study concludes that Eisenhower strongly desired to reach an accord with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to cease nuclear weapons testing. For Eisenhower, a test ban would ease Cold War tensions, slow the nuclear arms race, and build confidence toward disarmament; however, he faced continual resistance from his early scientific advisers, most notably Lewis L. Strauss and Edward Teller. Extensive research into previously unavailable government archival sources and collections of private manuscripts reveals the manipulative acts of test-ban opponents and other factors that inhibited Eisenhower's actions throughout his presidency. Meticulously analyzed, these sources underscore Eisenhower's dependence on the counsel of his science advisors, such as Strauss, James R. Killian, and George B. Kistiakowsky, to determine the course he pursued in regard to several components of his national security strategy. In addition to its comprehensive analysis of the test-ban debate, this book makes important contributions to the scholarly literature assessing Eisenhower's leadership and his approach to arms control. " Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents

detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war. In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology—and ignore the security risk—in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In *Exporting the Bomb*, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Israel has made a unique contribution to the nuclear age. It has created a special "bargain" with the bomb. Israel is the only nuclear-armed state that does not acknowledge its possession of the bomb, even though its existence is a common knowledge throughout the world. It only says that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. The bomb is Israel's collective ineffable the nation's last great taboo. This bargain has a name: in Hebrew, it is called *amimut*, or opacity. By adhering to the bargain, which was born in a secret deal between Richard Nixon and Golda Meir, Israel has created a code of nuclear conduct that encompasses both governmental policy and societal behavior. The bargain has deemphasized the salience of nuclear weapons, yet it is incompatible with the norms and values of a liberal democracy. It relies on secrecy, violates the public right to know, and undermines the norm of public accountability and oversight, among other offenses. It is also incompatible with emerging international nuclear norms. Author of the critically acclaimed *Israel and the Bomb*, Avner Cohen offers a bold and original study of this politically explosive subject. Along with a fair appraisal of the bargain's strategic merits, Cohen critiques its undemocratic flaws. Arguing that the bargain has become increasingly anachronistic, he calls for a reform in line with domestic democratic values as well as current international nuclear norms. Most ironic, he believes Iran is imitating Israeli *amimut*. Cohen concludes with fresh perspectives on Iran, Israel, and the effort toward global disarmament. This volume examines the possibility of a world without nuclear weapons. It starts from the observation that, although nuclear deterrence has long been dominant in debates about war and peace, recent events show that ridicule and stigmatization of nuclear weapons and their possessors is on the rise. The idea of non-nuclear peace has been around since the beginning of the nuclear revolution, but it may be staging a return. The first part reconstructs the criticism of nuclear peace, both past and present, with a particular emphasis on technology. The second part focuses on the most revolutionary change since the beginning of the nuclear revolution, namely the Humanitarian Initiative and the

resulting Nuclear Ban Treaty (2017), which allows imagining non-nuclear peace anew. The third and last part explores the practical and institutional prospects of a peace order without nuclear weapons. If non-nuclear peace advocates want to convince skeptics, they have to come up with practical solutions in the realm of global governance or world government. Nukespeak, the official language of nuclear war, dehumanises and legitimates the arms race. With contributions from prominent journalists, academics and disarmament activists, 'Nukespeak' examines this crucial aspect of the nuclear debate. It also looks at examples of censorship, at journalistic practice, at the language itself, and what practical steps can be taken to redress the balance. A useful and controversial intervention in the current argument about whether Britain should relinquish the bomb. - from the back cover.

After World War Two, European States expected further wars. Many States including Switzerland, France, Germany, wanted to create their own A-bombs. War did not happen. Instead Europe entered the longest period of peace in more than 2000 years. Thanks to the diplomacy of Robert Schuman, creator of the European Community, European States created an Atomic Energy Community which controlled the use of fissile material for bombs. Today among worldwide crises and threats of nuclear war, Europe needs to complete the obligations in the Euratom Treaty of 1957. How should democrats deal with the Indian bomb, the Pakistani bomb and the Iranian bomb? This short book shows how to apply the blueprint of the successful European experiment elsewhere. 'It is possible for the world to cure itself from the threat of nuclear war, ' says author, David H Price, Schuman historian, journalist and former Euratom official. 'Not only that, it is possible for the world to enter a time of great prosperity.' Originally published in 1984. This annotated bibliography will serve as a starting point for information on the issue of nuclear power. Arranged for easy use into three sections – Pro-Nuclear, Anti-Nuclear, and Neutral – the book cites over a hundred of the most important books on the subject, offering for each full bibliographic data and a lengthy annotation that is balanced and informative. This work, which features author, title and subject indexes, is simultaneously a collection-building tool, a guide for non-specialist library patrons and an invaluable aid for research.

Pakistan and the Bomb democratizes the debate over nuclear weapons in South Asia by highlighting a new generation of young Pakistani authors. The chapters in the book examine the nuclear policy choices facing Pakistan, from nuclear abstinence to outright weaponization, and apply the findings of the public opinion poll to evaluate a level of popular support for each option. Originally published in 1985, this book surveys how NATO policy sought to come to terms with the revolution in thinking about war which was brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons. It also examines the logic of deterrence. The book assesses the ethical issues involved, using as a framework the tradition of the idea of the Just War. A detailed modern version of the theory is elaborated and defended from an ethical viewpoint that gives due weight both to the mental states of the agent and to the consequences of his agency. The principle of non-combatant immunity is also examined for its clear relevance to the debate. Further considerations involve the effectiveness of deterrence and its morality, and the question whether deterrence can be effective even if its use is prohibited. The book also discusses the implications of various possible changes in NATO policy. Stopping the Bomb examines the historical development and effectiveness of American efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Nicholas L. Miller offers here a novel theory that argues changes in American nonproliferation policy are the keys to understanding the nuclear landscape from the 1960s onward. The Chinese and Indian nuclear tests in the 1960s and 1970s forced the US government, Miller contends, to pay new and considerable attention to the idea of nonproliferation and to reexamine its foreign policies. Stopping the Bomb explores the role of the United States in combating the spread of nuclear weapons, an area often ignored to date. He

explains why these changes occurred and how effective US policies have been in preventing countries from seeking and acquiring nuclear weapons. Miller's findings highlight the relatively rapid move from a permissive approach toward allies acquiring nuclear weapons to a more universal nonproliferation policy no matter whether friend or foe. Four in-depth case studies of US nonproliferation policy—toward Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, and France—elucidate how the United States can compel countries to reverse ongoing nuclear weapons programs. Miller's findings in *Stopping the Bomb* have important implications for the continued study of nuclear proliferation, US nonproliferation policy, and beyond. This book constitutes an original archival history of government secrecy, public relations and the debate surrounding nuclear weapons in Britain from 1970 to 1983. The book contrasts the secrecy and near-silence of the Heath, Wilson and Callaghan governments on nuclear issues in the 1970s with the increasingly vocal case made for the possession of nuclear weapons by the first Thatcher government following a shift in approach in 1980. This shift occurred against a background of rising Cold War tensions and a growing public nuclear debate in the UK. The book seeks to contextualise and explain this transformation, considering the role of party politics, structures and personalities inside the government, and external influences: notably the role of investigative journalists and think tanks in cracking open official secrecy and demanding justification for Britain's possession of nuclear weapons, and the peace movement in driving increasingly assertive public relations from 1980. The book draws on material from archives and interviews with key figures involved to provide an original and engaging account. It argues that this process of opening up saw significant disclosure of nuclear policy for the first time, and the most extensive public justification of the British nuclear capability to date, which has shaped public understanding of British nuclear weapons into the twenty-first century. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War studies, nuclear politics and security studies. “Brilliant, original, and important—the best analysis yet of why nuclear weapons don’t work.” —Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* Nuclear weapons have always been a serious but seemingly insoluble problem: while they’re obviously dangerous, they are also, apparently, necessary. This groundbreaking study shows why five central arguments promoting nuclear weapons are, in essence, myths. It clears up such common misconceptions as . . .

- Nuclear weapons necessarily shock and awe opponents, including Japan at the end of World War II
- Nuclear deterrence is reliable in a crisis
- Destruction wins wars
- The bomb has kept the peace for sixty-five years
- We can’t put the nuclear genie back in the bottle

Drawing on new information and the latest historical research, Wilson poses a fundamental challenge to the myths on which nuclear weapons policy is currently built. Using pragmatic arguments and an unemotional, clear-eyed insistence on the truth, he arrives at a surprising conclusion: nuclear weapons are enormously dangerous, but don’t appear to be terribly useful. In that case, he asks, why would we want to keep them? This book will be widely read and discussed by everyone who cares about war, peace, foreign policy, and security in the twenty-first century. “Magisterial in its sweep, research, and erudition, yet written in a direct, unstuffy style, which makes it an easy read.” —Commander Robert D. Green, Royal Navy (ret.) “This slim, persuasively argued, tightly written book provides much food for thought and could make some readers radically change their perceptions about nuclear weapons.” —Booklist *Super Bomb* unveils the story of the events leading up to President Harry S. Truman's 1950 decision to develop a "super," or hydrogen, bomb. That fateful decision and its immediate consequences are detailed in a diverse and complete account built on newly released archives and previously hidden contemporaneous interviews with more than sixty political, military, and scientific figures who were involved in the decision. Ken Young and Warner R. Schilling present the expectations, hopes, and fears of

the key individuals who lobbied for and against developing the H-bomb. They portray the conflicts that arose over the H-bomb as rooted in the distinct interests of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Los Alamos laboratory, the Pentagon and State Department, the Congress, and the White House. But as they clearly show, once Truman made his decision in 1950, resistance to the H-bomb opportunistically shifted to new debates about the development of tactical nuclear weapons, continental air defense, and other aspects of nuclear weapons policy. What Super Bomb reveals is that in many ways the H-bomb struggle was a proxy battle over the morality and effectiveness of strategic bombardment and the role and doctrine of the US Strategic Air Command. With tensions between Iran, Israel, and Western powers reaching new highs over the Islamic Republic's nuclear enrichment program, the tenth edition of the Munk Debates investigates how the world should respond to Iran's nuclear ambitions. For some, the case for a pre-emptive strike on Iran is ironclad. An Iranian bomb would flood the volatile Middle East with nuclear weapons and trap Israel in a state of perilous insecurity — along with much of the world's oil supply. Others argue that a nuclear Iran could be the very stabilizing force that the region needs, as the threat of nuclear war makes conventional conflicts more risky. These same voices also ask: can the West and Israel afford to attack Iran when doing so could roll back the Arab Spring and re-entrench reactionary forces throughout the Middle East? In this edition of the Munk Debates — Canada's premier international debate series — former Israel Defense Forces head of military intelligence Amos Yadlin, Pulitzer Prize-winning political commentator Charles Krauthammer, CNN host Fareed Zakaria, and Iranian-born academic Vali Nasr debate the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. For the first time ever, this electrifying debate, which played to a sold-out audience, is now available in print, along with candid interviews with the debaters. With tempers flaring between governments, the world's oil supply in peril, and global security at risk, the Munk Debate on Iran tries to answer: Can the world tolerate an Iran with nuclear weapons? Beskrivelse af debatten om atomprøvestop 1954 - 1960, og bestræbelserne for at få godkendt en traktat om atomprøvestop. South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region's nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia's nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia's nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors. "This book gives an analytic account of the dynamics of India's nuclear build-up. In contrast to conventional studies on the issue, the author puts forward a new model, which goes beyond the classic strategic concept of accepting security-related motives of arming behaviour. According to this, the structural conditions of India's regional security environment were permissive to India's nuclear development but not sufficient to make India's nuclearization imperative for maintaining its national security. At the core of the

argument lies the question about India's security considerations and their impact on India's nuclear policy development. The author explores this analytic model by including explanatory variables on the unit-level, where interests are generally related to symbolic, less strategic, values attributed to nuclear weapons. These play a significant role within India's domestic political party competition and among certain pressure groups. They have also influenced India's relationship with other countries on non-proliferation matters. This book identifies the role of the strategic elite in determining India's nuclear course. Furthermore, it argues that one of the pivotal driving forces behind India's quest for the nuclear bomb is India's struggle for international recognition and the strong, often obsessive sensitivities of India's elite regarding perceived 'acts of discrimination' or 'ignorance' by the West towards India."--Provided by publisher. In 1974 India exploded an atomic device. In May 1998 the new BJP Government exploded several more, encountering in the process domestic plaudits but international condemnation and a nuclear arms race in South Asia. This book is the first serious historical account of the development of nuclear power in India and of how the bomb came to be made. The author questions orthodox interpretations implying that it was a product of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Instead, he suggests that the explosions had nothing to do with national security as conventionally understood. Instead he demonstrates the linkages that existed between the two apparently separate discourses of national security and national development, and explores their common underlying basis in postcolonial states. The result is a remarkable book that breaks new ground in integrating comparative politics, international relations and cultural studies. "In May 1998, India and Pakistan put to rest years of speculation about whether they possessed nuclear technology and openly tested their weapons. Some believed nuclearization would stabilize South Asia; others prophesized disaster. Authors of two of the most comprehensive books on South Asia's new nuclear era, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, offer competing theories on the transformation of the region and what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators." "With these two major interpretations, Ganguly and Kapur tackle all sides of an urgent issue that has profound regional and global consequences. Sure to spark discussion and debate, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb* thoroughly maps the potential impact of nuclear proliferation."--Cubierta. The president loses control of fifty nukes for nearly an hour. Russian nuclear bombers almost bump wingtips with American fighter jets over the Pacific coast. North Korea detonates nuclear weapons underground. Iran's nuclear shroud is penetrated by a computer worm. Al-Qaeda goes on the hunt for Pakistan's bomb, and Israelis debate the merit of a preemptive nuclear strike. Treaties are signed, but thousands of nuclear weapons are still on hair-trigger alert. This is how the end begins. In this startling new book, bestselling author Ron Rosenbaum gives us a wake-up call about this new age of peril and delivers a provocative analysis of how close—and how often—the world has come to nuclear annihilation and why we are once again on the brink. Rosenbaum tracks down key characters in our new nuclear drama and probes deeply into their war game strategies, fears, and moral agonies. He travels to Omaha's underground nuclear command center, goes deep into the missile silo complexes beneath the Great Plains, and holds in his hands a set of nuclear launch keys. Along the way, Rosenbaum confronts the missile men as well as the general at the very top of our nation's nuclear command system with tough questions about the terrifying assumptions underlying it. He reveals disturbing flaws in our nuclear launch control system, suggests remedies for them, shows how the old Cold War system of bipolar deterrence has become dangerously unstable, and examines the new movement for nuclear abolition. Having explored the depths of Hitler's evil and the intense emotion of Shakespeare's tragedies, Rosenbaum now has produced a powerful, urgently needed work that challenges us: Can we undream our nightmare? Nuclear disarmament is firmly back on the



international agenda. But almost all current thinking on the subject is focused on the process of reducing the number of weapons from thousands to hundreds. This rigorous analysis examines the challenges that exist to abolishing nuclear weapons completely, and suggests what can be done now to start overcoming them. The paper argues that the difficulties of 'getting to zero' must not preclude many steps being taken in that direction. It thus begins by examining steps that nuclear-armed states could take in cooperation with others to move towards a world in which the task of prohibiting nuclear weapons could be realistically envisaged. The remainder of the paper focuses on the more distant prospect of prohibiting nuclear weapons, beginning with the challenge of verifying the transition from low numbers to zero. It moves on to examine how the civilian nuclear industry could be managed in a nuclear-weapons-free world so as to prevent rearmament. The paper then considers what political-security conditions would be required to make a nuclear-weapons ban enforceable and explores how enforcement might work in practice. Finally, it addresses the latent capability to produce nuclear weapons that would inevitably exist after abolition, and asks whether this is a barrier to disarmament, or whether it can be managed to meet the security needs of a world newly free of the bomb. Making the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party's nuclear tests in 1998 its starting point, this book examines how opinion amongst India's 'attentive' public shifted from supporting nuclear abstinence to accepting -- and even feeling a need for -- a more assertive policy, by examining the complexities of the debate in India on nuclear policy in the 1990s. The study seeks to account for the shift in opinion by looking at the parallel processes of how nuclear policy became an important part of the public discourse in India, and what it came to symbolise for the country's intelligentsia during this decade. It argues that the pressure on New Delhi in the early 1990s to fall in line with the non-proliferation regime, magnified by India's declining global influence at the time, caused the issue to cease being one of defence, making it a focus of nationalist pride instead. The country's nuclear programme thus emerged as a test of its ability to withstand external compulsions, guaranteeing not so much the sanctity of its borders as a certain political idea of it -- that of a modern, scientific and, most importantly, 'sovereign' state able to defend its policies and set its goals. From the author of the classic *The Wizards of Armageddon* and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war—and Presidents' actions in nuclear crises—from Truman to Trump. Fred Kaplan, hailed by *The New York Times* as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences. In May 1998, India and Pakistan put to rest years of speculation about whether they possessed nuclear technology and openly tested their weapons. Some believed nuclearization would stabilize South Asia; others prophesized disaster. Authors of two of the most comprehensive books on South Asia's new nuclear era, Amit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur offer competing theories on the transformation of the region and what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators. Ganguly begins with an outcome-based approach emphasizing the results of militarized conflict. In his opinion, nuclear weapons have prevented Indo-Pakistani disputes from blossoming into full-scale war. Kapur counters with a process-based approach stressing the specific pathways that lead to conflict and escalation. From his

perspective, nuclear weapons have fueled a violent cycle of Pakistani provocation and Indian response, giving rise to a number of crises that might easily have spun into chaos. Kapur thus believes nuclear weapons have been a destabilizing force in South Asia and could similarly affect other parts of the world. With these two major interpretations, Ganguly and Kapur tackle all sides of an urgent issue that has profound regional and global consequences. Sure to spark discussion and debate, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb* thoroughly maps the potential impact of nuclear proliferation.

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